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                      OPINION OF THE COURT 
                                            
                                 
NYGAARD, Circuit Judge. 
     Vita D'Ambrosio, executrix of the estate of Rose D'Ambrosio, 
appeals from a judgment of the United States Tax Court upholding 
a statutory notice of deficiency filed against the estate by the 
Commissioner of Internal Revenue.  The tax court held that, even 
though the decedent had sold her remainder interest in closely 
held stock for its fair market value, 26 U.S.C. § 2036(a)(1) 
brought its entire fee simple value back into her gross estate.  
We will reverse and remand with the direction that the tax court  
enter judgment in favor of appellant. 
 
                                I. 
     The facts in this case have been stipulated by the parties. 
Decedent owned, inter alia, one half of the preferred stock of 
Vaparo, Inc.; these 470 shares had a fair market value of 
$2,350,000.  In 1987, at the age of 80, decedent transferred her 
remainder interest in her shares to Vaparo in exchange for an 
annuity which was to pay her $296,039 per year and retained her 
income interest in the shares.  There is no evidence in the 
record to indicate that she made this transfer in contemplation 
of death or with testamentary motivation.  According to the 
actuarial tables set forth in the Treasury Regulations, the 
annuity had a fair market value of $1,324,014.  The parties 
stipulate that this was also the fair market value of the 
remainder interest.   
     Decedent died in 1990, after receiving only $592,078 in 
annuity payments and $23,500 in dividends.  Her executrix did not 
include any interest in the Vaparo stock when she computed 
decedent's gross estate.  The Commissioner disagreed, issuing a 
notice of deficiency in which she asserted that the gross estate 
included the full, fee simple value of the Vaparo shares at the 
date of death, still worth an estimated $2,350,000, less the 
amount of annuity payments decedent received during life.  The 
estate then petitioned the tax court for redetermination of the 
alleged tax deficiency. 
     The tax court, relying largely on Gradow v. United States, 
11 Cl. Ct. 808 (1987), aff'd, 897 F.2d 516 (Fed Cir. 1990), and 
Estate of Gregory v. Commissioner, 39 T.C. 1012 (1963), ruled in 
favor of the Commissioner.  Eschewing any attempt to construe the 
language of either the Code or the applicable Treasury 
Regulations, the tax court reasoned that the transfer of the 
remainder interest in the Vaparo stock was an abusive tax 
avoidance scheme that should not be permitted: 
     In the instant case, we conclude that Decedent's 
     transfer of the remainder interest in her preferred 
     stock does not fall within the bona fide sale exception 
     of section 2036(a).  Decedent's gross estate would be 
     depleted if the value of the preferred stock, in which 
     she had retained a life interest, was excluded 
     therefrom.  Decedent's transfer of the remainder 
     interest was of a testamentary nature, made when she 
     was 80 years old to a family-owned corporation in 
     return for an annuity worth more than $1 million less 
     than the stock itself.  Given our conclusion that 
     Decedent did not receive adequate and full 
     consideration under section 2036(a) for her 470 shares 
     of Vaparo preferred stock, we hold that her gross 
     estate includes the date of death value of that stock, 
     less the value of the annuity. 
 
Estate of D'Ambrosio v. Commissioner, 105 T.C. 252, ___ (1995).  
The executrix now appeals; we have jurisdiction under 26 U.S.C. § 
7482.  Both parties agree that our standard of review for this 
issue of law is plenary. 
 
                               II. 
     Our nation's tax laws have, for several generations, imposed 
a tax upon decedents' estates.  Under 26 U.S.C. § 2033, a 
decedent's gross estate includes "[t]he value of all property to 
the extent of any interest therein of the decedent at the time of 
his death."  In addition the Code contains, among other 
provisions, § 2036(a), which provides, in pertinent part: 
     The value of the gross estate shall include the value 
     of all property to the extent of any interest therein 
     of which the decedent has at any time made a transfer 
     (except in case of a bona fide sale for adequate and 
     full consideration in money or money's worth), by trust 
     or otherwise, under which he has retained for his life 
     or for any period not ascertainable without reference 
     to his death or for any period which does not in fact 
     end before his death-- 
 
     (1)  the possession or enjoyment of, or the right to 
     the income from the property[.] 
 
Section 2036(a) effectively discourages manipulative transfers of 
remainder interests which are really testamentary in character by 
"pulling back" the full, fee simple value of the transferred 
property into the gross estate, except when the transfer was "a 
bona fide sale for adequate and full consideration." 
     There is no dispute that Rose D'Ambrosio retained a life 
interest in the Vaparo stock and sold the remainder back to the 
company.  The issue is whether the sale of a remainder interest 
for its fair market value constitutes "adequate and full 
consideration" within the meaning of § 2036(a).  Appellant argues 
that it does.  The Commissioner takes the position that only 
consideration equal to the fee simple value of the property is 
sufficient.  Appellant has the better argument. 
 
                                A. 
     The tax court and the Commissioner rely principally on four 
cases, Gradow v. United States, 11 Cl. Ct. 808 (1987), aff'd for 
the reasons set forth by the claims court, 897 F.2d 516 (Fed. 
Cir. 1990); United States v. Past, 347 F.2d 7 (9th  Cir. 1965); 
Estate of Gregory v. Commissioner, 39 T.C. 1012 (1963); United 
States v. Allen, 293 F.2d 916 (10th  Cir. 1961).  We find these 
cases either inapposite or unpersuasive; we will discuss them in 
chronological order. 
     In Allen, the decedent set up an irrevocable inter vivostrust in 
which she retained a partial life estate and gave the 
remainder (as well as the remaining portion of the income) to her 
children.  Apparently realizing the tax liability she had created 
for her estate under the predecessor of § 2036, she later 
attempted to sell her retained life interest to her son for an 
amount slightly in excess of its fair market value.  After she 
died, the estate took the position that, because decedent had 
divested herself of her retained life interest for fair market 
value, none of the trust property was includable in her gross 
estate.  The Court of Appeals disagreed, holding that 
consideration is only "adequate" if it equals or exceeds the 
value of the interest that would otherwise be included in the 
gross estate absent the transfer.  See 293 F.2d at 917.  Although 
acknowledging that the decedent owned only a life estate, which 
she could not realistically hope to sell for its fee simple 
value, the court nevertheless rejected the estate's argument, 
opining: 
     It does not seem plausible, however, that Congress 
     intended to allow such an easy avoidance of the taxable 
     incidence befalling reserved life estates.  This result 
     would allow a taxpayer to reap the benefits of property 
     for his lifetime and, in contemplation of death, sell 
     only the interest entitling him to the income, thereby 
     removing all of the property which he has enjoyed from 
     his gross estate.  Giving the statute a reasonable 
     interpretation, we cannot believe this to be its 
     intendment.  It seems certain that in a situation like 
     this, Congress meant the estate to include the corpus 
     of the trust or, in its stead, an amount equal in 
     value. 
 
Id. at 918 (citations omitted). 
 
     Allen, however, is inapposite, as the Commissioner now 
concedes, because it involved the sale of a life estate after the 
remainder had already been disposed of by gift, a testamentary 
transaction with a palpable tax evasion motive.  This case, in 
contrast, involves the sale of a remainder for its stipulated 
fair market value.  Nevertheless, we agree with its rationale 
that consideration should be measured against the value that 
would have been drawn into the gross estate absent the transfer.  
As the tax court persuasively reasoned in a later case: 
     [W]here the transferred property is replaced by other 
     property of equal value received in exchange, there is 
     no reason to impose an estate tax in respect of the 
     transferred property, for it is reasonable to assume 
     that the property acquired in exchange will find its 
     way into the decedent's gross estate at his death 
     unless consumed or otherwise disposed of in a 
     nontestamentary transaction in much the same manner as 
     would the transferred property itself had the transfer 
     not taken place. . . . 
 
          In short, unless replaced by property of equal 
     value that could be exposed to inclusion in the 
     decedent's gross estate, the property transferred in a 
     testamentary transaction of the type described in the 
     statute must be included in his gross estate.   
 
Estate of Frothingham v. Commissioner, 60 T.C. 211, 215-16 (1973) 
(emphasis added). 
     Gregory presents a closer factual analogy to D'Ambrosio's 
situation.  Gregory was a "widow's election" case involving the 
testamentary disposition of community property.  Typically in 
such cases, the husband wishes to pass the remainder interest in 
all of the marital property to his children, while providing for 
the lifetime needs of his surviving spouse.  In a community 
property state, however, half of the marital property belongs to 
the wife as a matter of law, so he cannot pass it by his own 
will.  To circumvent this problem, the will is drafted to give 
the widow a choice: take her one-half share in fee simple, 
according to law, or trust over her half of the community 
property in exchange for a life estate in the whole.  Put another 
way, she trades the remainder interest in her half of the 
community property in exchange for a life estate in her husband's 
half. 
     In Gregory, the widow exchanged property worth approximately 
$66,000 for a life estate with an actuarial value of only around 
$12,000; by the time she died eight years later, the property she 
gave up had appreciated to approximately $102,000.  The tax court 
compared the $102,000 outflow to the $12,000 consideration and 
concluded that the widow's election did not constitute a bona 
fide sale for an adequate and full consideration.  39 T.C. at 
1015-16.  It also stated that "the statute excepts only those 
bona fide sales where the consideration received was of a 
comparable value which would be includable in the transferor's 
gross estate."  Id. at 1016 (emphasis added). 
     We believe that the Gregory court erred in its analysis, 
although it reached the correct result on the particular facts of 
that case.  There is no way to know ex ante what the value of an 
asset will be at the death of a testator; although the date of 
death can be estimated through the use of actuarial tables, the 
actual appreciation of the property is unknowable, as are the 
prevailing interest, inflation and tax rates.  Consequently, 
there is no way to ever be certain in advance whether the 
consideration is adequate and thus no way to know what tax 
treatment a transfer will receive.  This level of uncertainty all 
but destroys any economic incentive to ever sell a remainder 
interest; yet, Congress never said in § 2036 that all transfers 
of such interests will be taxed at their fee simple value or that 
those transfers are illegal.  Instead, it clearly contemplated 
situations in which a sale of a remainder would not cause the 
full value of the property to fall into the gross estate.  
Without some express indication from Congress, we will not 
presume it intended to eliminate wholesale the transfers of 
remainder interests.  Therefore, rather than evaluate the 
adequacy of the consideration at the time the decedent dies, we 
will compare the value of the remainder transferred to the value 
of the consideration received, measured as of the date of the 
transfer.  Here, we need not address that valuation issue, 
because it is stipulated that the fair market value of the stock 
was the same on the date of transfer as it was on the date of 
death. 
     In Gregory, however, the $12,000 the decedent received was 
grossly inadequate against the value of the property she 
transferred, regardless of the valuation date.  The court was 
therefore correct that the transfer was not for adequate and full 
consideration.  Because of that gross inadequacy, however, the 
holding of Gregory does not extend to the issue now before us: 
whether, when a remainder is sold for its stipulated fair market 
value, the consideration received is inadequate because it is 
less than the fee simple value of the property. 
     The Past case was factually somewhat different, in that it 
involved a divorce settlement, but the substance of the 
transaction was the same as in Gregory: the sale of a remainder 
in one-half of the marital property in exchange for a life estate 
in the whole.  In that case, however, the court valued the 
property the divorcing spouse gave up at about $244,000 and the 
life estate she received at about $143,000; as a result, it held 
that the consideration was inadequate.  347 F.2d at 13-14.  In 
making these valuations, however, the court took the fee simple 
value of the trust property and divided it in half.  This was 
analytically incorrect, however, because the divorcing wife never 
gave up the life estate in her half of the marital property.  She 
contributed only her remainder interest in that half, and that is 
the value that should have been used in the court's analysis.  
Alternatively, the Past court could have used the fee simple 
value of the wife's share, but it would then have needed to 
measure that against the value of the life estate in both halves 
of the property.  Had the court employed this latter methodology, 
it would have seen that the $287,000 value of the life estate 
exceeded the $244,000 she contributed and would have found 
adequate consideration.  Instead, it compared "apples and 
oranges" and, we believe, reached the wrong result. 
 
                                B. 
     The facts in Gradow were similar to those in Gregory; both 
are "widow's election" cases.  That case is particularly 
significant, however, because the court focused on the statutory 
language of § 2036.  The court began its analysis, however, with 
a discussion of Gregory, Past and Allen.  While acknowledging 
that it was not bound by those three cases, the Gradow court 
found them persuasive, for two reasons: 1) "the most natural 
reading of § 2036(a) leads to the same result[;]" and 2) their 
holding is "most consistent with the purposes of § 2036(a)."  11 
Cl. Ct. at 813.  We will discuss these rationales in turn.  
 
                                1. 
     We examine first the Gradow court's construction of the 
statute.  It opined that 
     there is no question that the term "property" in the 
     phrase "The gross estate shall include ... all property 
     ... of which the decedent has at any time made a 
     transfer" means that part of the trust corpus 
     attributable to plaintiff.  If § 2036(a) applies, all 
     of Betty's former community property is brought into 
     her gross estate.  Fundamental principles of grammar 
     dictate that the parenthetical exception which then 
     follows--"(except in case of a bona fide sale...)"-- 
     refers to a transfer of that same property, i.e. the 
     one-half of the community property she placed into the 
     trust. 
 
Id. (ellipses in original).  We disagree; although the Gradowcourt's 
rationale appears plausible, we note that the court, in 
quoting the statute, left out significant portions of its 
language.  Below is the text of § 2036, with the omitted words 
emphasized: 
     The value of the gross estate shall include the value 
     of all property to the extent of any interest thereinof which the 
decedent has at any time made a transfer 
     (except in case of a bona fide sale for an adequate and 
     full consideration in money or money's worth), by trust 
     or otherwise, under which he has retained for his life 
     * * * (1) the possession or enjoyment of, or the right 
     to the income from, the property * * * 
 
     After parsing this language, we cannot agree with the Gradowcourt's 
conclusions that "property" refers to the fee simple 
interest and that adequate consideration must be measured against 
that value.  Rather, we believe that the clear import of the 
phrase "to the extent of any interest therein" is that the gross 
estate shall include the value of the remainder interest, unless 
it was sold for adequate and fair consideration. 
     In addition to § 2036, Treas. Reg. § 20.2036-1 also 
addresses this issue.  It provides, in pertinent part (emphases 
added): 
          (a) In general.  A decedent's gross estate 
     includes under section 2036 the value of any interestin property 
transferred by the decedent . . . except to 
     the extent that the transfer was for an adequate and 
     full consideration in money or money's worth if the 
     decedent retained or reserved (1) for his life . . .  
 
          (i) The use, possession, right to the income, or 
     other enjoyment of the transferred property, . . .  
 
Appellant refers us to the emphasized words "interest" and 
"transferred" in § 20.2036-1(a) and argues that "adequate and 
full consideration" must be measured against the interest 
transferred.  The Commissioner, on the other hand, looks at the 
phrase "of the transferred property" in § 20.2036-1(a)(i) and 
concludes that, because one cannot retain any lifetime interest 
in a remainder, "property" must refer to the fee simple interest.  
     The regulation, unfortunately, is not exactingly drafted and 
does not parse "cleanly" under either party's interpretation.  
The Commissioner is of course correct that one cannot enjoy any 
sort of life interest in a remainder.  On the other hand, 
appellant validly asks why, if the drafters of the regulation 
meant to include the full value of the property, they referred to 
the value of any "interest in property transferred."  On balance, 
we believe that, if some words of the regulation must be 
construed as surplusage, it is more reasonable and faithful to 
the statutory text to render inoperative the word "transferred" 
in § 20.2036-1(a)(i) than it would be to strike "interest" in the 
first part of the section.  We think it is likely that, although 
the choice of verbiage was less than precise, the drafters meant 
merely to refer to the "transferred" property so as to 
distinguish it from other property owned by the estate.  It 
strains the judicial imagination, however, to conclude that the 
drafters used the term of art "interest in property" when they 
meant simply "property." 
                                2. 
     The Gradow court also believed that its construction of § 
2036 was "most consistent" with its purposes.  11 Cl. Ct. at 813.  
The tax court in this case, although recognizing that the issue 
has spawned considerable legal commentary and that scholars 
dispute its resolution, 105 T.C. at ___, was persuaded that 
decedent's sale of her remainder interest was testamentary in 
character and designed to avoid the payment of estate tax that 
otherwise would have been due.  Id. at ___.  It noted 
particularly that the transfer was made when decedent was eighty 
years old and that the value of the annuity she received was over 
$1 million less than the fee simple value of the stock she gave 
up.  Id.  Again, we disagree. 
     We too are cognizant that techniques for attempting to 
reduce estate taxes are limited only by the imagination of estate 
planners, and that new devices appear regularly.  There is, to be 
sure, a role for the federal courts to play in properly limiting 
these techniques in accordance with the expressed intent of 
Congress.  Under long-standing precedent, for example, we measure 
"consideration" in real economic terms, not as it might be 
evaluated under the common law of contract or property.  E.g., 
Commissioner v. Wemyss, 324 U.S. 303, 65 S. Ct. 652 (1945) 
(promise of marriage insufficient consideration, for gift tax 
purposes, for tax-free transfer of property); Merrill v. Fahs, 
324 U.S. 308, 65 S. Ct. 655 (1945) (same).  Likewise, when the 
transfer of the remainder interest is essentially gratuitous and 
testamentary in character, we focus on substance rather than form 
and require that the full value of trust property be included in 
the gross estate, unless "the settlor absolutely, unequivocally, 
irrevocably, and without possible reservations, parts with all of 
his title and all of his possession and all of his enjoyment of 
the transferred property."  See Commissioner v. Estate of Church, 
335 U.S. 632, 645, 69 S. Ct. 322, 329 (1949) (gratuitous transfer 
of remainder in trust for family members with possibility of 
reverter to estate); accord Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 
110, 60 S. Ct. 444, 447 (consolidation of three cases involving 
"dispositions of property by way of trust in which the settlement 
provides for return or reversion of the corpus to the donor upon 
a contingency terminable at his death"). 
     On the other hand, it is not our role to police the 
techniques of estate planning by determining, based on our own 
policy views and perceptions, which transfers are abusive and 
which are not.  That is properly the role of Congress, whose 
statutory enactments we are bound to interpret.  As stated 
supra, we think the statutory text better supports appellant's 
argument. 
     Even looking at this case in policy terms, however, it is 
difficult to fathom either the tax court's or the Commissioner's 
concerns about the "abusiveness" of this transaction.  A 
hypothetical example will illustrate the point.   
     A fee simple interest is comprised of a life estate and a 
remainder.  Returning to the widow's election cases, assume that 
the surviving spouse's share of the community property is valued 
at $2,000,000.  Assuming that she decides not to accept the 
settlement and to keep that property, its whole value will be 
available for inclusion in the gross estate at death, but only as 
long as the widow lives entirely on the income from the property.  
If she invades principal and sells some of the property in order 
to meet living expenses or purchase luxury items, then at least 
some of that value will not be included in the gross estate.  Tax 
law, of course (with the exception of the gift tax), imposes no 
burdens on how a person spends her money during life. 
     Next, assume that same widow decides to sell her remainder 
and keep a life estate.  As long as she sells the remainder for 
its fair market value, it makes no difference whether she 
receives cash, other property, or an annuity.  All can be 
discounted to their respective present values and quantified.  If 
she continues to support herself from the income from her life 
estate, the consideration she received in exchange for the 
remainder, if properly invested, will still be available for 
inclusion in the gross estate when she dies, as Frothingham and 
Gregory require.  On the other hand, if her life estate is 
insufficient to meet her living expenses, the widow will have to 
invade the consideration she received in exchange for her 
remainder, but to no different an extent than she would under the 
previous hypothetical in which she retained the fee simple 
interest.  In sum, there is simply no change in the date-of-death 
value of the final estate, regardless of which option she 
selects, at any given standard of living.   
     On the other hand, if the full, fee simple value of the 
property at the time of death is pulled back into the gross 
estate under § 2036(a), subject only to an offset for the 
consideration received, then the post-sale appreciation of the 
transferred asset will be taxed at death.  Indeed, it will be 
double-taxed, because, all things being equal, the consideration 
she received will also have appreciated and will be subject to 
tax on its increased value.  In addition, it would appear 
virtually impossible, under the tax court's reasoning, ever to 
sell a remainder interest; if the adequacy of the consideration 
must be measured against the fee simple value of the property at 
the time of the transfer, the transferor will have to find an 
arms-length buyer willing to pay a fee simple price for a future 
interest.  Unless a buyer is willing to speculate that the future 
value of the asset will skyrocket, few if any such sales will 
take place. 
     Another potential concern, expressed by the Gradow court, is 
that, under appellant's theory, "[a] young person could sell a 
remainder interest for a fraction of the property's [current, fee 
simple] worth, enjoy the property for life, and then pass it 
along without estate or gift tax consequences."  11 Cl. Ct. at 
815.  This reasoning is problematic, however, because  it ignores 
the time value of money.  Assume that a decedent sells his son a 
remainder interest in that much-debated and often-sold parcel of 
land called Blackacre, which is worth $1 million in fee simple, 
for its actuarial fair market value of $100,000 (an amount which 
implicitly includes the market value of Blackacre's expected 
appreciation).  Decedent then invests the proceeds of the sale.  
If the rates of return for both assets are equal and decedent 
lives exactly as long as the actuarial tables predict, the 
consideration that decedent received for his remainder will equal 
the value of Blackacre on the date of his death.  The equivalent 
value will, accordingly, still be included in the gross estate.  
Moreover, decedent's son will have only a $100,000 basis in 
Blackacre, because that is all he paid for it.  He will then be 
subject to capital gains taxes on its appreciated value if he 
decides to ever sell the property.  Had Blackacre been passed by 
decedent's will and included in the gross estate, the son would 
have received a stepped-up basis at the time of his father's 
death or the alternate valuation date.  We therefore have great 
difficulty understanding how this transaction could be abusive. 
     On this appeal, the Commissioner likewise argues for the 
Gradow rule on the rationale that "the retained life interest is 
in closely held stock whose dividend treatment is subject to the 
control of decedent and her family.  In such circumstances, the 
amount of the dividend income that decedent was to receive from 
her life income interest in the Vaparo preferred stock was 
susceptible of manipulation[.]"  Commissioner's Brief at 33.  
There is no evidence, however, that the Vaparo dividends weremanipulated, 
and the Commissioner directs us to no authority that 
we should presume so.  In addition, implicit in her argument is 
the proposition that the life estate was overvalued by the 
executor and the remainder correspondingly undervalued.  Such a 
position, however, is directly contrary to the Commissioner's own 
stipulation regarding the values of those interests. 
     The Commissioner also asserts that the D'Ambrosio estate 
plan is "calculated to deplete decedent's estate in the event 
that she should not survive as long as her actuarially projected 
life expectancy."  Commissioner's Brief at 34-35.  We note first 
that the Commissioner does not argue that decedent transferred 
her remainder in contemplation of imminent death under such 
circumstances that the tables should not be applied.  Leaving 
aside the untimely death of Rose D'Ambrosio, any given transferor 
of a remainder is equally likely to outlive the tables, in which 
case she would collect more from her annuity, the gross estate 
would be correspondingly larger and the Commissioner would 
collect more tax revenue than if the remainder had never been 
transferred.  
 
                                3. 
     Several courts have followed the holding in Gradow, but none 
of their opinions provides any cogent analysis that persuade us 
it is sound.  See Pittman v. United States, 878 F. Supp. 833, 835 
(E.D.N.C. 1994) (applying Gradow without analysis); Wheeler v. 
United States, No. SA-94-CA-964, 77 A.F.T.R.2d 96-1405, 96-1411, 
1996 WL 266420, *4-*5 (W.D. Tex. Jan. 26, 1996) (similar).  Two 
other courts have questioned the soundness of Gradow, but have 
either applied it reluctantly or decided the case on other 
grounds.  See Parker v. United States, 894 F. Supp. 445, 447 
(N.D. Ga. 1995); Estate of McLendon v. Commissioner, Nos. 20324- 
90, 20325-90, T.C. Memo. 1993-459, 66 T.C.M. (CCH) 946, T.C.M. 
(P-H) ¶ 93,459, 1993 WL 391134, n.24 and accompanying text (Tax 
Ct. Sept. 30, 1993), rev'd on other grounds, 77 A.F.T.R.2d 666 
(5th Cir. 1995). 
     The holdings of Gradow and the earlier cases such as Gregoryhave 
inspired considerable legal commentary, most of it critical.  
See Jacques T. Schlenger et al., Cases Addressing Sale of 
Remainder Wrongly Decided, 22 Estate Planning 305 (1995) 
(reproducing Professor Pennell's remarks criticizing Pittman as a 
"mindless" decision); 2 A. James Casner, Estate Planning § 
6.15.2, at 6-146-50, 6-158 (Supp. 1995) (Professor Casner, 
criticizing Gradow court as lacking understanding of future 
interests, economics and time value of money); Jacques T. 
Schlenger et al., Property Included in Estate Despite Sale of 
Remainder Interest, 23 Estate Planning 132 (1996) (criticizing 
reasoning of tax court in D'Ambrosio); Richard B. Stephens et 
al., Federal Estate and Gift Taxation ¶ 4.08[1], at 4-138 (6th 
ed. 1991) (stating that payment of full consideration for 
remainder interest alone is sufficient under § 2036, but noting 
Gregory, Past and Gradow in a footnote); Peter M. Weinbaum, Are 
Sales of Remainder Interests Still Available in Light of a New 
Decision?, 14 Estate Planning 258 (1987) (criticizing Gradow for 
quoting and analyzing § 2036(a) out of context and for ignoring 
the value of the life estate in the wife's community property as 
consideration received in the transfer).  As discussed supra, we 
find this criticism to be well-taken. 
                               III. 
     Because we conclude that the tax court erred as a matter of 
law when it determined that the consideration received by Rose 
D'Ambrosio for her remainder interest was not adequate and full, 
we will reverse and remand for it to enter judgment in favor of 
the estate.  
                      
Estate of Rose D'Ambrosio v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue 
No. 95-7643 
 
COWEN, Circuit Judge, dissenting. 
          Today the majority holds that a tax-avoidance approach 
previously considered "too good to be true" can, at least in 
limited circumstances, actually be true.  I respectfully dissent.  
The tax court's opinion is supported by well-established case law 
and the plain language of the Internal Revenue Code.  It should 
be affirmed. 
                                I. 
          The value of a gross estate includes the value of all 
property held by the decedent on the date of death.  I.R.C. § 
2033.  Pursuant to section 2036(a), for federal estate tax 
purposes the gross estate also includes any property that is the 
subject of an inter vivos transfer and in which the taxpayer 
reserves an income interest in that property until death.  The 
sole exception authorized by section 2036(a) is a "bona fide 
sale" in which the transferor receives "adequate and full 
consideration" in exchange for the transferred property.  I.R.C. 
§ 2036(a).  The majority holds that under section 2036(a), 
"adequate and full consideration" must be provided merely for 
that portion of the taxpayer's property interest actually 
transferred, rather than for the full value of the property that 
is the basis for the ongoing income interest.   
          The majority excludes from the computation of "full and 
adequate consideration" the value of decedent's life interest in 
the transferred stock, on the grounds that D'Ambrosio retained 
that interest.  The intended purpose of section 2036 is to 
prevent decedents from avoiding estate taxes by selling their 
property to a third party but retaining the benefits of ownership 
during their lives.  It includes in a decedent's gross estate the 
date-of-death value of 
          all property to the extent of any interest therein of 
          which the decedent has at any time made a transfer 
          (except in the case of a bona fide sale for an adequate 
          and full consideration in money or money's worth), by 
          trust or otherwise, under which he has retained for his 
          life . . . the possession or enjoyment of, or the right 
          to the income from, the property. 
 
I.R.C. § 2036(a).  When a taxpayer makes a transfer with a 
retained life interest, the powerful arm of section 2036(a) pulls 
into the gross estate the full value of the transferred property, 
not merely the value of the remainder interest. 
           The majority accepts the view of the estate that the 
decedent "sold" only the remainder interest to Vaparo.  This view 
of section 2036 sanctions tax evasion:  It enables strategic 
segmentation of the property into multiple interests, with 
"adequate and full consideration" now required only for a 
specific transferred segment, rather than the indivisible whole.  
Such an interpretation of section 2036(a) thwarts its very 
purpose, enabling taxpayers to avoid paying estate taxes on 
property while retaining the income benefits of ownership.  I 
would affirm the tax court's holding that "adequate and full 
consideration" assesses whether the consideration received is 
equal to the value of the property that would have remained in 
the estate but for the transfer, not whether it is commensurate 
with the value of the artfully separated portion of the property 
technically transferred.  
                               II. 
          The well-reasoned case law construing section 2036(a) 
supports the ruling of the tax court.  That law correctly tests 
the adequacy of the consideration received by a taxpayer against 
the amount that otherwise would be included in that taxpayer's 
gross estate.  The majority distinguishes these cases by focusing 
on irrelevant distinctions, and overlooks the commanding 
principle that a taxpayer who fails to convey all interests in an 
asset, continuing to derive some benefit from the asset until 
death, must include the entire asset in the taxpayer's estate.   
          In Gradow v. United States, 11 Cl. Ct. 808 (1987), 
aff'd, 897 F.2d 516 (Fed. Cir. 1990), the surviving spouse 
transferred her full community property interest into a trust 
that held all of the couple's community property.  Thereafter, 
the trust paid her all of the trust income during her life, and 
distributed the entire corpus of the trust to her son upon her 
death.  Gradow's executor asserted that decedent's retained life 
interest was received in exchange for adequate and full 
consideration, so that none of the trust's assets were includable 
in her gross estate.  The court disagreed, holding that the 
consideration paid by the decedent had to cover not only the 
remainder interest that was left to her son in the trust, but 
also her half of the underlying community property.   
          Other courts have acknowledged and followed this rule.  
See United States v. Past, 347 F.2d 7 (9th Cir. 1965) 
(consideration decedent received from trust had to be measured 
against the total value of the property she contributed to the 
trust, not only against the remainder interest in the property); 
United States v. Allen, 293 F.2d 916 (10th Cir. 1961) (decedent 
who received most of trust's income for life but before death 
sold her remainder interest to her children had to include the 
value of the trust assets corresponding to the percentage of the 
trust's income that she received); Estate of Gregory v. 
Commissioner, 39 T.C. 1012, 1016 (1963) (decedent who received a 
life estate in exchange for transferring property to a trust 
failed to qualify for exception because "[t]he statute excepts 
only those bona fide sales where the consideration received was 
of a comparable value which would be includable in the 
transferor's gross estate").   
          The paramount purpose of section 2036(a) is to prevent 
the depletion of estate assets when individuals retain the use 
and enjoyment of those assets until death.  In Commissioner v. 
Estate of Church, 335 U.S. 632, 69 S.Ct. 322 (1949), the Supreme 
Court emphatically noted that 
          an estate tax cannot be avoided by any trust transfer 
          except by a bona fide transfer in which the settlor, 
          absolutely, unequivocally, irrevocably, and without 
          possible reservations, parts with all of his title and 
          all of his possession and all of his enjoyment of the 
          transferred property.   
 
Id. at 645.  D'Ambrosio clearly fails this requirement that all 
title, enjoyment, and possession of the transferred property be 
unequivocally halted.  Commenting on the forerunner to section 
2036(a) more than a half century ago, the Supreme Court stated 
that the law 
          taxes not merely those interests which are deemed to 
          pass at death according to refined technicalities of 
          the law of property.  It also taxes inter vivostransfers that 
are too much akin to testamentary 
          dispositions not to be subjected to the same excise.   
 
Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 112, 60 S.Ct. 444, 448  
 
(1940). 
 
          These cases clearly demonstrate that the concept of 
"adequate and full consideration," as used in sections 2035 
through 2038, must be construed with reference to the special 
problems posed by trying to prevent testamentary-type transfers 
from evading estate tax.  The bona fide sale analysis, which 
exempts property from inclusion in the gross estate pursuant to 
section 2036(a), cannot focus merely on the value of the limited 
property interest that is sold.  It must also consider the 
property that would otherwise be included in the decedent's gross 
estate. 
                               III. 
          The estate asserts that the tax court erred because it 
misunderstood or disregarded the "economic reality" of a sale of 
a remainder interest.  To the contrary, it was precisely the tax 
court's awareness of the economic realities of a retained 
interest transaction that led it to follow well-established law.  
Executrix D'Ambrosio alleges that Gradow is inapposite and, in 
any event, was erroneously decided.  She states that   
          if the Decedent had retained and invested the dividends 
          from the Vaparo Stock and from the annuity payments 
          received during her life, the potential value of her 
          gross estate as a result of the sale would be worth no 
          less on the date of her death, than if she had never 
          sold the remainder interest in the Vaparo Stock or if 
          she had sold the entire interest in the Vaparo Stock 
          and invested the proceeds therefrom for the rest of her 
          life.   
 
Appellant's brief at 11.   
          This view ignores the very reason for section 2036(a). 
Its purpose is precisely to prevent taxpayers from retaining the 
practical benefits of asset ownership during their lifetime while 
divesting themselves for estate tax purposes of a portion of that 
property.  As the court in Gradow correctly explained: 
          [The "economic reality" argument] flies squarely in the 
          face of the Supreme Court's analysis as to the 
          assumptions and purposes behind 2036(a).  [T]he Court 
          has taught that while tax limitation is perfectly 
          legitimate, § 2036(a) is a reflection of Congress' 
          judgment that transfers with retained life estates are 
          generally testamentary transactions and should be 
          treated as such for estate tax purposes.  The fond hope 
          that a surviving spouse would take pains to invest, 
          compound, and preserve inviolate all life income from 
          half of a trust, knowing that it would thereupon be 
          taxed without his having received any lifetime benefit, 
          is a slim basis for putting a different construction on 
          § 2036(a) than the one heretofore consistently adopted. 
 
11 Cl. Ct. at 815-816.   
           
          Even if the annuity decedent received were not an 
attempt to deplete her property for estate tax purposes, courts 
have consistently held that section 2036(a) does not exempt 
transfers of property in which the taxpayer retains an income 
interest in his or her underlying assets.  As the Tenth Circuit 
concluded in Allen: 
          It does not seem plausible . . . that Congress intended 
          to allow such an easy avoidance of the taxable 
          incidence befalling reserved life estates.  This result 
          would allow a taxpayer to reap the benefits of property 
          for his lifetime and, in contemplation of death, sell 
          only the interest entitling him to the income, thereby 
          removing all of the property which he has enjoyed from 
          his gross estate.  . . .  [I]n a situation like this, 
          Congress meant the estate to include the corpus of the 
          trust or, in its stead, an amount equal in value. 
 
293 F.2d at 918 (citations omitted). 
 
                               IV. 
 
          I would affirm the decision of the tax court.  I 
respectfully dissent. 
 
 
 
 
